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Abstract
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is the
most popular algorithm on solving two-player
zero-sum extensive games with imperfect infor-
mation and achieves state-of-the-art results in
practice. However, the performance of CFR is
not fully understood, since empirical results on
the regret are much better than the known upper
bound in (Zinkevich et al., 2008). Moreover, CFR
has to traverse the whole game tree in each round,
which is time-consuming in large scale games. In
this paper, we present a novel technique, lazy up-
date, which can avoid traversing the whole game
tree in each round. We propose a novel analysis
on the regret of CFR with lazy update, which can
also be applied to the vanilla CFR, resulting in a
much tighter regret bound than that in (Zinkevich
et al., 2008). Inspired by lazy update, we further
present a novel CFR variant, named Lazy-CFR.
Compared to traversing O(|I|) information sets
in the vanilla CFR, Lazy-CFR needs only to tra-
verse O(
√|I|) information sets per round while
keeping the regret bound almost the same, where
I is the class of all information sets. As a result,
Lazy-CFR shows better convergence results com-
pared with the vanilla CFR. Experimental results
consistently show that Lazy-CFR outperforms the
vanilla CFR significantly.
1. Introduction
Extensive games provide a mathematical framework for
modeling the sequential decision-making problems with
imperfect information, which is common in economic de-
cisions, negotiations and security. In this paper, we focus
on solving two-player zero-sum extensive games with im-
perfect information (TEGI). In a TEGI, there are an envi-
1Dept. of Comp. Sci. & Tech., BNRist Center, State Key
Lab for Intell. Tech. & Sys., THBI Lab, Tsinghua Univer-
sity, Beijing, 100084, China. Correspondence to: Jun Zhu <dc-
szj@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn>, Yichi Zhou <vofhqn@gmail.com>.
ronment with uncertainty and two players on opposite sides
(Koller & Megiddo, 1992).
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al.,
2008) provides a state-of-the-art algorithm for solving TE-
GIs with much progress in practice (Brown & Sandholm,
2017; Moravcˇík et al., 2017). The most famous application
of CFR is Libratus, the first program that defeats top human
players in heads-up no-limit Texas Hold’em poker (Brown
& Sandholm, 2017). CFR works based on the fact that mini-
mizing the regrets of both players makes the time-averaged
strategy to approach the Nash Equilibrium (NE) (Zinke-
vich et al., 2008). Furthermore, CFR bounds the original
regret with a summation of many immediate counterfac-
tual regrets, each of which corresponds to an infomation
set (infoset). These immediate regrets are defined by coun-
terfactual rewards and they can be iteratively minimized
by online learning algorithms, e.g., regret matching (RM)
(Blackwell et al., 1956) and Hedge (Freund & Schapire,
1997).
Though CFR has succeeded in practice, the behavior of
CFR is not fully understood. Specifically, experiments have
shown that the regret is significantly smaller than the upper
bound in (Zinkevich et al., 2008). So at least some further
theoretical analysis can be provided on the regret bound of
CFR. Besides, a more crucial limitation of CFR is that it
requires traversing the whole game tree in each round, which
is time-consuming in large-scale games. This is because
we have to apply RM to every immediate regret in each
round. Though various attempts have been made to avoid
traversing the whole game tree in each round so that they
can significantly speed up the vanilla CFR in practice, they
are lack of theoretical guarantees on the running time or
can even degenerate in the worst case (Brown & Sandholm,
2015; 2016; Lanctot et al., 2009).
In this paper, we present a novel technique called lazy up-
date, which provides a unified framework to avoid traversing
the whole game tree in CFR. For each infoset, CFR with
lazy update segments the time horizon into disjoint subsets
with consecutive elements. We call these subsets as seg-
ments. And then CFR with lazy update updates the strategy
only at the start of each segment and keeps the strategy on
that infoset the same within each segment. So that lazy up-
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date can save computation resources. It is noteworthy that
our framework includes the vanilla CFR as a degenerated
case, in which the length of each segment is 1. Moreover,
we present a novel analysis on the regret of CFR with lazy
update. Our analysis is also based on the immediate regrets
as in (Zinkevich et al., 2008). The difference is that, in con-
trast to (Zinkevich et al., 2008)’s analysis which takes each
immediate regret independently, our analysis reveals the
correlation among them via the underlying optimal strategy.
Specifically, we prove that it is impossible that immediate
regrets are all very large simultaneously. As an application
of our analysis, we refine the regret bound of CFR from
O(|I|√T logA) to O(√ξDT logA) 1 where I = ∪iIi,
Ii is the infosets of player i, A is the number of actions, D
is the depth of the game tree, T is the length of time and ξ
is a quantity reflecting the structure of the game tree, whose
value varies from D to |I|, and in most cases ξ ≈ √|I|.
We will define ξ in Sec. 3.
Obviously, in CFR with lazy update, we should balance
the trade-off between running time and regret by select-
ing a suitable segmentation procedure. What surprising
is that an extremely simple segmentation rule turned out
to make a dramatic improvement. In our final algorithm,
Lazy-CFR as shown in Alg. 1, we simply update the strat-
egy on an infoset by RM or Hedge if the cumulative reach
probability on it becomes larger than a threshold. And
we further show that Lazy-CFR only needs to update the
strategies on O(
√|I|) infosets in each round which is sig-
nificantly smaller than O(|I|) in CFR, while the regret of
Lazy-CFR can be controlled in O(D
√
ξT logA). Accord-
ingly, Lazy-CFR requires running time O(
√
|I|ξD2 logA
2 )
to compute an -Nash Equilibrium, whilst the vanilla CFR
needs O( |I|ξD logA2 ) running time. So that we accelerate
CFR by a factor O(
√|I|/D), which is a dramatic improve-
ment in large scale games, since D (the depth of the game
tree) is usually in the order of O(log |I|).
We then analyze the regret lower bound. We show that no
algorithm can achieve a regret lower than Ω(
√
ξT logA)
by constructing an explicit adversary. This means that the
regrets of both CFR and Lazy-CFR are near-optimal within
a factor of O(
√
D) and O(D) respectively.
We empirically evaluate our algorithm on the standard
benchmark, Leduc Hold’em (Brown & Sandholm, 2015).
We compare with the vanilla CFR, MC-CFR (Lanctot et al.,
2009), and CFR+ (Bowling et al., 2017). It is noteworthy
that the same idea of Lazy-CFR can also be applied to CFR+,
and we name the resulted algorithm Lazy-CFR+. The anal-
1The upper bound in (Zinkevich et al., 2008) is O(|I|√TA),
since they use RM as the online learning solver. The regret bound
can be reduced into O(|I|√T logA) by simply replacing RM
with Hedge.
ysis on Lazy-CFR can be directly applied to Lazy-CFR+.
Experiments show that Lazy-CFR and Lazy-CFR+ dramati-
cally improve the convergence rates of CFR and CFR+ in
practice, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 reviews
some useful preliminary knowledge of this work. In Sec. 3,
we present the idea of lazy update with the analysis, and our
algorithm is presented in Sec. 4. After that, we present the
regret lower bound in Sec. 5. And then we discuss some
related work in Sec. 6. Finally, we show our experimental
results in Sec. 7.
2. Notations and Preliminaries
We first introduce the notations and definitions of extensive
games and TEGIs. Then we introduce an online learning
concept of regret minimization. After that, we discuss the
connection between TEGIs and regret minimization. This
connection triggered the powerful algorithm, CFR. Finally,
we finish this section by discussing the details of CFR.
2.1. Extensive games
Extensive games (see (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) page
200 for a formal definition.) compactly model the decision-
making problems with sequential interactions among multi-
ple agents. An extensive game can be represented by a game
tree H of histories, where a history is a sequence of actions
in the past. Suppose that there areN players participating in
an extensive game and let c denote the chance player which
is usually used to model the uncertainty in the environment.
Let [N ] := {1, · · · , N}. A player function P is a mapping
from H to [N ]∪{c} such that P (h) is the player who takes
an action after h. And each player i ∈ [N ] receives a reward
ui(h) ∈ [−1, 1] at a terminal history h.
Let A(h) denote the set of valid actions of P (h) after h,
that is, ∀a ∈ A(h), (h, a) ∈ H . Let A = maxh |A(h)|.
A strategy of player i is a function σi which assigns h a
distribution over A(h) if P (h) = i. A strategy profile σ
consists of the strategy for each player, i.e., σ1, · · · , σN .
We will use σ−i to refer to all the strategies in σ except σi.
And we use the pair (σi, σ−i) to denote the full strategy pro-
file. In games with imperfect information, actions of other
players are partially observable to a player i ∈ [N ]. So for
player i, some different histories may not be distinguishable.
Thus, the game tree can be partitioned into disjoint infor-
mation sets (infoset). Let Ii denote the collection of player
i’s infosets, we have that two histories h, h′ ∈ I ∈ Ii are
not distinguishable to player i. Thus, σi should assign the
same distribution over actions to all histories in an infoset
I ∈ Ii. With a little abuse of notations, we let σi(I) denote
the strategy of player i on infoset I ∈ Ii.
Moreover, let piσ(h) denote the probability of arriving at
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a history h if the players take actions according to strat-
egy σ. Obviously, we can decompose piσ(h) into the
product of each player’s contribution, that is, piσ(h) =∏
[N ]∪{c} pi
i
σ(h). Similarly, we can define piσ(I) =∑
h∈I piσ(h) as the probability of arriving at an infoset I
and piiσ(I) denote the corresponding contribution of player
i. Let pi−iσ (h) and pi
−i
σ (I) denote the product of the contri-
butions on arriving at h and I , respectively, of all players
except player i.
In game theory, the solution of a game is often referred to
a Nash equilibrium (NE) (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994).
With a little abuse of notations, let ui(σ) denote the ex-
pectated reward of player i if all players take actions ac-
cording to σ. An NE is a strategy profile σ∗, in which
every σ∗,i is optimal if given σ∗,−i, that is, ∀i ∈ [N ],
ui(σ∗) = maxσi ui((σi, σ∗,−i)).
In this paper, we concern on computing an approximation
of an NE, namely an -NE (Nisan et al., 2007), since com-
puting an -NE is usually faster in running time. An -NE
is a strategy profile σ such that:
∀i ∈ [N ], ui(σ) ≥ max
σ′,i
ui((σ′,i, σ−i))− .
With the above notations, a two-player zero-sum extensive
game with imperfect information (TEGI) is an extensive
game with N = 2 and u1(h) + u2(h) = 0 for a termi-
nal history h. And the -NE in a TEGI can be efficiently
computed by regret minimization, see later in this section.
2.2. Regret minimization
Now we introduce regret, a core concept in online learn-
ing (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006). Many powerful on-
line learning algorithms can be framed as minimizing some
kinds of regret, therefore known as regret minimization
algorithms. Generally, the regret is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Regret). Consider the case where a player
takes actions repeatedly. At each round, the player selects
an action wt ∈ Σ,2 where Σ is the set of valid actions. At
the same time, the environment 3 selects a reward function
ft. Then, the overall reward of the player is
∑T
t=1 ft(wt),
and the regret is defined as:
RT = max
w′∈Σ
T∑
t=1
ft(w
′)−
T∑
t=1
ft(wt).
One of the most famous example of online learning is online
linear optimization (OLO) in which ft is a linear function.
2The valid action set Σ is generalized, that is, the element in
Σ can be anything, e.g., a distribution or a vector in a Euclidean
space.
3The environment may be an adversary in online learning.
If Σ is the set of distributions over some discrete set , an
OLO can be solved by standard regret minimization algo-
rithms, e.g., regret matching (RM) (Blackwell et al., 1956;
Abernethy et al., 2011) or Hedge (Freund & Schapire, 1997).
CFR employs RM or Hedge as a sub-procedure, so we
summarize OLO, RM and Hedge as follows:
Definition 2 (Online linear optimization (OLO), regret
matching (RM) and Hedge). Consider the online learn-
ing problem with linear rewards. In each round t, an agent
plays a mixed strategy wt ∈ ∆(A), where ∆(A) is the set
of probabilities over the set A, while an adversary selects a
vector ct ∈ R|A|. The reward of the agent at this round is
〈wt, ct〉 where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the operator of inner product.
The goal of the agent is to maximize the cumulative reward
which is equivalent to minimizing the following regret:
RoloT = max
w∈∆(A)
T∑
t=1
〈w, ct〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈wt, ct〉.
Let RoloT,+(a) = max(0,
∑T
t=1 ct(a) −
∑T
t=1〈wt, ct〉), RM
picks wt as follows:
wt+1(a) =

Rolot,+(a)∑
a′ R
olo
t,+(a
′) , maxa′ R
olo
t,+(a
′) > 0.
1
|A| , otherwise.
(1)
According to the result in (Blackwell et al., 1956), RM enjoys
the following regret bound:4
RoloT ≤ O

√√√√ T∑
t=1
‖ct‖22
 . (2)
Let st(a) = exp(
∑t
t′=1 ct′(a)), Hedge picks wt(a) =
st(a)/(
∑
a′ st(a
′)). According to (Freund & Schapire,
1997), Hedge enjoys the following regret bound:
RoloT ≤ O

√√√√log |A| T∑
t=1
max
a∈A
c2t (a)
 . (3)
2.3. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)
CFR is developed on a connection between -NE and regret
minimization. This connection is naturally established by
considering repeatedly playing a TEGI as an online learning
problem. It is worthy to note that there are two online
learning problems in a TEGI, one for each player.
Suppose player i takes σit at time step t and let σt =
(σ1t , σ
2
t ). Consider the online learning problem for player
4(Blackwell et al., 1956)’s result implicitly indicates this regret
bound. However, to the best of our knowledge, there’s no existing
work providing a regret bound in this form with a detailed proof.
So we prove it in the Appendix B.
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i by setting wt := σit and f
i
t (σ
i) := ui((σi, σ−it )). The
regret for player i is RiT := maxσ R
i
T (σ) where R
i
T (σ) :=∑T
t=1 u
i((σi, σ−it ))−
∑T
t=1 u
i((σit, σ
−i
t )).
Furthermore, define the time-averaged strategy, σ¯iT , as fol-
lows:
σ¯iT (I) =
∑
t pi
i
σt(I)σ
i
t(I)∑
t pi
i
σt(I)
.
It is well-known that (Nisan et al., 2007):
Lemma 1. If 1TR
i
T ≤ /2 for i = 1, 2, then (σ¯1T , σ¯2T ) is an
-NE.
However, it is hard to directly apply regret minimization
algorithms to TEGIs, since the reward function u is non-
convex with respect to σ. One approach is that as in (Gordon,
2007), we first transform a TEGI to a normal-form game,
and then apply the Lagragian-Hedge algorithm (Gordon,
2005). However, this approach is time-consuming since
the dimension of the corresponding normal-form game is
exponential to |I|. To address this problem, Zinkevich et al.
(2008) propose a novel decomposition of the regret RiT into
the summation of immediate regrets as 5:
RiT (σ)
=
∑
t
∑
I∈Ii,P (I)=i
piiσ(I)pi
−i
σt (I)(u
i(σt|I→σ(I), I)− ui(σt, I))
(4)
where σ|I→σ′(I) denotes the strategy generated by modify-
ing σ(I) to σ′(I) and ui(σ, I) denote the reward of player i
conditioned on arriving at the infoset I if the strategy σ is
executed.
Further, Zinkevich et al. (2008) upper bound Eq. (4) by the
counterfactual regret:
RiT (σ)
≤
∑
I∈Ii,P (I)=i
(∑
t
pi−iσt (I)(u
i(σt|I→σ(I), I)− ui(σt, I))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The OLO for each infoset
(5)
For convenience, we call pi−iσt (I)u
i(σt|I→a, I) the counter-
factual reward of action a at round t.
Notice that Eq. (5) essentially decomposes the regret min-
imization of a TEGI into O(|I|) OLOs. So that, in each
round, we can apply RM directly to each individual OLO to
minimize the counterfactual regret. And the original regret
maxσ R
i
T (σ) is also minimized since the counterfactual re-
gret is an upper bound. So that, with Eq. (2), Eq. (5) and the
5Zinkevich et al. (2008) directly upper bounded RiT by the
counterfactual regret, i.e., Eq. (5), and omitted the derivation of
Eq. (4). So we present the derivation of Eq. (4) in Appendix C.
fact that the norm of a conterfactual reward vector is at most
O(
√
A), we can upper bound the counterfactual regret by
O(|I|√AT ). However, we have to traverse the whole game
tree, which is very time-consuming in large scale games.
In the sequel, we are going to show that updating the strategy
on every infoset is not indispensable. Intuitively, this is
because the regret is determined by the norm of the vector
of counterfactual reward on each node (see Eq. (2)). And
on most nodes, the corresponding norm is very small, since
pi−iσt is a probability.
3. Lazy update and regret upper bound
In this section, we present the idea of lazy update. We first
discuss lazy update in the context of OLO. And then we
leverage the idea of lazy update to extensive games. After
that, we provide our analysis on the regret bound of CFR
with lazy update in Sec. 3.2. Our analysis is novel since
it reveals the correlation among immediate regrets and en-
codes the structure of the game tree explicitly. The regret
bound is presented in our main theorem, Thm 1. Further-
more, Thm 1 can also be used to analyze the regret bound of
CFR. Thus, by applying Thm 1, we refined the regret bound
of the vanilla CFR.
The idea of lazy update and its analysis do not depend on
the choice of OLO solver. So that in our demonstration
of lazy update, we assume OLOs are solved by RM. And
similarly, we only present the detailed proof with RM as the
OLO solver. Proof of the variant employing Hedge as the
OLO solver can be simply derived by substituting Eq. (2)
with Eq.(3) that can achieve an O(
√
logA) upper bound on
A rather than O(
√
A).
3.1. Lazy update for OLOs
We now introduce lazy update for OLOs in Defn. 2, see Fig.
1 for an illustration. We call an online learning algorithm
for OLOs as a lazy update algorithm if:
• It divides time steps [T ] into n disjoint subsets with
consecutive elements, that is, {ti, ti + 1, · · · , ti+1 −
1}ni=1 where 1 = t1 < t2 · · · < tn+1 = T + 1. For
convenience, we call these subsets as segments.
• It updates wt at time steps t = ti for some i and keeps
wt the same within each segment. That is, the OLO
with T steps collapses into a new OLO with n steps.
And we have c′j =
∑tj+1−1
t=tj
ct where ct is the vector
selected by the adversary in the original OLO at time
step t and c′j is the vector selected by the adversary in
the collapsed OLO at time step j.
According to Eq. (2), the regret of RM with lazy update is
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c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
Apply RM
c′1 = c1 + c2 c
′
2 = c3 + c4 c
′
3 = c5 + c6
Apply RM
Figure 1. An illustration on RM with lazy update for OLOs. On the
bottom is the standard RM; on the top is the RM with lazy update.
The lengths of time in the original OLO and the collapsed OLO
are 6 and 3 respectively. Suppose ‖c1‖2 = ‖c3‖2 = ‖c5‖2 = 1
and ‖c2‖2 = ‖c4‖2 = ‖c6‖2 = 0.01. Then the regrets are
almost the same, since
∑6
t=1 ‖ct‖22 = 3.0003 and
∑3
t=1 ‖c′t‖22 ≤
3× 1.012 ≈ 3.03.
bounded by:
O

√√√√√ n∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥c′i :=
ti+1−1∑
t=ti
ct
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
 (6)
RM with lazy update does not need to update the strategy
at each round. And if the segmentation is reasonable, that
is,
∑n
i=1 ‖c′i‖2 ≈
∑T
j=1 ‖cj‖2, then the regrets of the lazy
update RM and the vanilla RM are similar in amount.
It is noteworthy that in OLOs, the running time of lazy
update RM is still O(AT ) which is the same as applying
RM directly, whereA is the dimension of ct. This is because
we have to compute
∑ti+1
t=ti+1
ct which is time-consuming.
Fortunately, this problem can be addressed in TEGIs, see
Sec. 4 for how to overcome it by exploiting the structure of
the game tree.
3.2. Lazy update for TEGIs
We now extend the idea of lazy update to TEGIs. Ac-
cording to Eq. (5), the regret minimization procedure
can be divided into |I| OLOs, one for each infoset. For
convenience, for each infoset I ∈ Ii, we divide the time
steps [T ] into n(I) segments {tj(I), · · · , tj+1(I)− 1}n(I)j=1
where 1 = t1(I) < t2(I) · · · < tn(I)+1(I) = T + 1.
Let rj(I, a) =
∑tj+1(I)−1
t=tj(I)
pi−iσt (I)u
i(σt|I→a, I) denote
the summation of the counterfactual rewards over a seg-
ment. And let rj(I) = [rj(I, a)]a∈A(I) denote the vec-
tor consisting of rj(I, a), a ∈ A(I). Similar to lazy up-
date for OLOs, we only update the strategy on infoset I at
tj(I) according to RM. Let σ′j(I) denote the strategy after
the j-th update on infoset I , that is, σt(I) := σ′j(I) for
t ∈ {tj(I), tj(I) + 1, · · · , tj+1(I)− 1}. According to Eq.
(6), the regret of applying RM to the collapsed OLO on
infoset I can be bounded as:
RlazyT (I) := max
σ∈Σ(I)
n(I)∑
j=1
〈σ − σ′j(I), rj(I)〉 ≤
√√√√n(I)∑
j=1
‖rj(I)‖2
Now we analyze the regret upper bound on the overall regret
of a TEGI, i.e., Eq. (4), of the above lazy update algorithm.
The upper bound is presented in our main theorem, Thm. 1.
Theorem 1. The regret of CFR with lazy update can be
bounded as follows:
RiT (σ) = O
(√(∑
I′,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I ′)
)
η(σ)
)
(7)
≤√DTη(σ) (8)
where η(σ) :=
∑
I∈Ii pi
i
σi(I)
∑n(I)
j=1 f(rj(I))∑T
t=1 pi
−i
σt (I)
where
f(rj(I)) = ‖rj(I)‖2 for CFR with RM and f(rj(I)) =
maxa |rj(I)(a)|2 logA for CFR with Hedge.
Sketch of proof. We defer the proof to Appendix C. Our
analysis is also on the immediate regrets as in (Zinkevich
et al., 2008) and the improvements are on following two
aspects:
First, instead of providing an upper bound on the counter-
factual regret in Eq. (5), we directly analyze the bound
of the original regret Eq. (4). This makes us to be able
to analyze piiσ(I)’s effect on R
i
T (σ). To see how this im-
proves the regret bound intuitively, consider the case that
RlazyT (I) is large on an infoset I . Though R
lazy
T (I) is large,
it makes RiT (σ) increasing dramatically only if pi
i
σ(I) is
also large. This is because the immediate regret of infoset
I is piiσ(I)R
lazy
T (I) and R
i
T (σ) is the summation of imme-
diate regrets. Moreover, it is impossible that piiσ(I) is very
large on all infosets, since piiσ(I) is the probability of ar-
riving at I contributed by player i. So that the immediate
regrets cannot be very large at the same time.
Second, we upper bound the regret by quantities
(
∑
I,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I
′) and η(σ) in Eq. (7)) which can re-
flect the structure of the underlying game tree. So that we
can give a more detailed analysis on these quantities, which
leads to a tighter regret bound.
According to Thm 1, we can bound the regret by bounding
maxσ η(σ). In the sequel of this paper, we upper bound
η(σ) using the following inequalities:
Lemma 2. Let G(σ) = ξi maxI,j(
∑tj+1
t=tj(I)+1
pi−iσt (I)), for
CFR with RM, we have:
η(σ) ≤ AG(σ) (9)
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for CFR with Hedge, we have:
η(σ) ≤ G(σ) logA
where ξi = maxσ
∑
I∈Ii,P (I)=i pi
i
σ(I), which is signifi-
cantly smaller than |I| since piiσ(I) is a probability. For
convenience, let ξ = max(ξ1, ξ2).
Derivation of Eq. (9). With straight-forward computations,
we have:
η(σ) ≤ A
∑
I∈Ii
piiσi(I)
∑n(I)
j=1 ‖
∑tj+1(I)
t=tj(I)+1
pi−iσt (I)‖2∑
t pi
−i
σt (I)
≤ A
∑
I∈Ii
piiσi(I) maxj
(
tj+1∑
t=tj(I)+1
pi−iσt (I))
≤ Amax
I,j
 tj+1∑
t=tj(I)+1
pi−iσt (I)
(∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)
)
≤ O(ξiA) max
I,j
 tj+1∑
t=tj(I)+1
pi−iσt (I)

A tighter regret bound of CFR: It is easy to see that the
vanilla CFR is a special case of lazy update, in which tj(I)+
1 = tj+1(I) for every j, I . So we can apply Thm 1 and Eq.
(9) to CFR directly, which leads to a tighter regret bound as
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. With RM, the regret of the vanilla CFR is
bounded by O(
√
ξDAT ) . With Hedge, the regret of the
vanilla is O(
√
ξDT logA).
Proof. We only need to bound maxσ η(σ) and then insert
it into Thm 1. By directly applying Eq. (9) and the fact that
pi−iσt (I) ≤ 1, we have η(σ) ≤ O(Aξi).
4. Lazy-CFR
In this section, we discuss how to design an efficient variant
of CFR with the framework of lazy update.
Intuitively, an efficient -NE solver for TEGIs, which is
based on minimizing the regret of the OLO on each infoset,
should satisfy the following two conditions. The first one
is to prevent the overall regret from growing too fast. And
according to Thm 1, we only need to make η(σ′) to be
small for all σ′. Furthermore, this can be done by making
‖∑tj+1t=tj(I)+1 pi−iσt (I)‖ small for all I, j in the framework
of lazy update. The second condition is to update as small
number of infosets as possible during a round, which is
equivalent to make
∑
I∈Ii n(I) small.
Algorithm 1 Lazy-CFR
1: A two-player zero-sum extensive game.
2: Initialize the reward vector r(I) for all I ∈ Ii
3: while t < T do
4: for all i ∈ {1, 2} do
5: Q = {Ir} where Ir is the root of the infosets tree.
6: while Q is not empty. do
7: Pop I from Q.
8: Update the strategy on I via RM or Hedge.
9: For I ′ ∈ succ(I), if mt(I ′) ≥ 1, push I ′ into
Q.
10: end while
11: end for
12: for all I do
13: Update the reward vector on I if any player’s strat-
egy on infosets below I has been modified.
14: end for
15: end while
The key to balance the tradeoff between n(I) and
maxj ‖
∑tj+1(I)
t=tj(I)+1
pi−iσt (I)‖ is that maxσ
∑
I∈Ii pi
−i
σ (I) is
significantly smaller than |Ii|. To make a clean upper bound
on maxσ
∑
I∈Ii pi
−i
σ (I), we make the following mild as-
sumption:
Assumption 1. 1), If P (h) = i, then P ((h, a)) 6= i; 2)The
tree of infosets for each player is a full A-ary tree.
Assumption 1 naturally leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If a TEGI satisfies Assumption 1, then
∀σ,∑I∈Ii pi−iσ (I) = O(√|Ii|).
Proof. For simplicity, we denote Iih ∈ Ii as the corre-
sponding infoset of h for player i. Notice that, ∀h ∈
H,P (h) = i, we have ∀a, pi−iσ (Iih) = pi−iσ (I−ih,a) and∑
a pi
−i
σ (I
i
h,a,a′) = pi
−i
σ (I
−i
h,a). Thus, with Assumption 1,∑
a,a′ pi
−i
σ (I
i
h,a,a′) = Api
−i
σ (I
i
h), which means the accumu-
lated reaching probability increases O(A)-times every two
layer while the nodes (i.e. infosets) increases O(A2)-times
every two layer. Thus ∀σ,∑I∈Ii pi−iσ (I) = O(√|Ii|).
With the above analysis, our algorithm is pretty simple:
at time step t, let τt(I) denote the last time step we up-
date the strategy on infoset I before t. Let mt(I) :=∑t
τ=τt(I)+1
pi−iστ (I) denote the summation of probabilities
of arriving at I after τt(I), which is contributed by all play-
ers except i. Let subt(I) denote the subtree 6 rooted at
infoset I . Let succ(I) denote a subset of subt(I) such that
∀I ′ ∈ succ(I), P (I ′) = i and ∀I ′′ ∈ subt(I), if I ′′ is an
ancient of I ′ ∈ succ(I), then P (I ′′) 6= i or I ′′ = I . We
6Here, the tree is composed of infosets rather than histories.
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simply update the strategies on infosets recursively as fol-
lows: after updating the strategy on infoset I , we keep on
updating the strategies on the infosets from succ(I) with
mt(I) ≥ 1. We summarize our algorithm in Alg. 1.
Now we analyze Alg. 1. To give a clean theoretical result,
we further make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Every infoset in the tree of infosets is corre-
sponding to n nodes in the game tree.
It is noteworthy that Alg. 1 is still valid and efficient without
both Assumption 1 and 2.
Now we present our theoretical results on the regret and
time complexity of Alg. 1 in Lem 4 and Lem 5 respectively.
Lemma 4. If the underlying game satisfies Assumption
1, then, with RM , the regret of Alg. 1 is bounded by
O(D
√
ξAT ); with Hedge, the regret can be bounded by
O(D
√
ξT logA).
Proof. According to Thm 1 and Eq. (9), we only need to
bound maxtmt(I). Below, we prove that mt(I) ≤ d(I)
where d(I) is the depth of infoset I in the game tree.
We exploit mathematical induction to prove mt(I) ≤ d(I).
If it holds for d(I) ≤ d. Consider d + 1, it is obvious
that at the last time step at which its parent was updated,
there is at most 1 cumulated probability at infoset I , thus
mt(I) ≤ mt(pa(I)) + 1 < d(pa(I)) + 1 ≤ d(I) where
I ∈ succ(pa(I)).
Lemma 5. The time complexity of Alg. 1 is O(#nodest)
at round t, where #nodest is the number of nodes in the
tree of histories which are touched by Alg. 1 during round
t. More specifically, if the underlying game satisfies both
Assumption 1 and 2, then the time complexity of Alg. 1 in
each round is O(
√|Ii|n) on average.
Proof. There is a little engineering involved to prove the
first statement. We defer the details of the engineering into
Appendix A.
The second statement is proved as follows. According to
Corollary 1, on average, there are at most O(
√|I|) infosets
which satisfy mt(I) > 1, so that there are O(n
√|I|) nodes
touched in each round.
According to Lem 4, 5 and 1, the regret is about O(
√
D)
times larger than the regret of CFR, whilst the running time
is about O(
√|I|) times faster than CFR per round. Thus,
according to Lem 1, 3 and with a little algebra, we know
that Alg. 1 is O(
√|I|/D) times faster than the vanilla CFR
to achieve the same approximation error, since the vanilla
CFR has to traverse the whole game tree in each round. The
improvement is significant in large scale TEGIs.
Lazy-CFR+: We can directly apply the idea of lazy update
to CFR+ (Bowling et al., 2017), which is a novel variant of
CFR. CFR+ uses a different regret minimization algorithm
instead of RM. Tammelin et al. (2015) prove that the running
time of CFR+ is at most in the same order as CFR, but in
practice CFR+ outperformes CFR. To get Lazy-CFR+, we
only need to replace RM by RM+ in Alg. 1 and use the
method of computing time-averaged strategy as in (Bowling
et al., 2017). We empirically evaluate Lazy-CFR+ in Sec. 7.
5. Regret lower bound
In this section, we analyze the worst case lower bound on
the regret. We consider the standard adversarial setting
in online learning, in which an adversary selects σ−it and
a reward function uit : Z → [0, 1] where Z is the set of
terminal nodes in the infoset tree of player i.
Thus, to get a lower bound, we need to explicitly
construct σ−it and u
i
t. For convenience, let −i de-
note the players besides i, let ζ = {σ̂i : σ̂i =
arg maxσi
∑
I∈Ii,P (I)=i pi
i
σi(I)}. Let M := {I ∈ Ii :
∃σi ∈ ζ, piiσi(I) > 0}. It can be shown that M forms a sub-
tree of Ii. Our construction on σ−it and uit can be divided
into two stages.
1. For I ∈ Z, I /∈ M , uit(I) = 0 for all t. This enforces
player i take actions on M , otherwise, it will receive
reward 0.
2. For I ∈ M,P (I) 6= i, we first generate a(I) ∼
Multinomial( 1A ), and then set σ
−i
t (I)(a(I)) = 1,
and σ−it (I)(a) = 0 for a 6= a(I). Intuitively, this
step separates RiT into O(ξ
i) isolated OLOs, each of
which is with dimension A and would be repeated for
about O(T/ξi) rounds, since only one of them will
be triggered on according to our construction on σ−it .
Thus, combined with the lower bound proved by (Cesa-
Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006), each OLO incurs a regret
of about Ω(
√
T/ξi logA). Then we can prove that
maxpi−iσt ,ut
RiT ≥ ξiΩ(
√
T/ξi logA) as in Thm 2.
Theorem 2. For any algorithm, we have:
sup
T,A
max
pi−iσt ,ut
RiT ≥ Ω(
√
ξiT logA) (10)
Proof. See Appendix D for a formal proof.
By comparing the regret lower bound in Thm 2 and the
regret upper bounds of CFR and Lazy-CFR as in Lem 3
and Lem 4, we can see that both CFR and Lazy-CFR have
near-optimal regret bounds within a factor of O(
√
D) and
O(D) respectively.
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(a) Leduc-5 (b) Leduc-10 (c) Leduc-15
Figure 2. Convergence for Lazy-CFR, Lazy-CFR+, MC-CFR, CFR and CFR+ on the Leduc Hold’em.
6. Related work
There are several variants of CFR which attempt to avoid
traversing the whole game tree at each round. Monte-Carlo
based CFR (MC-CFR) (Lanctot et al., 2009), also known
as CFR with partial pruning, uses Monte-Carlo sampling
to avoid updating the strategy on infosets with small prob-
ability of arriving at. Pruning-based variants (Brown &
Sandholm, 2016; 2015) skip the branches of the game tree
if they do not affect the regret, but their performance can
deteriorate to the vanilla CFR on the worst case.
In order to solve a large scale extensive game, there are sev-
eral techniques used except CFR, we give a brief summary
on these techniques. (Brown & Sandholm, 2017) proposed
a technique on sub-game solving, which makes us to be
able to solve the NE on a subtree. Another useful technique
is abstraction. Abstraction (Gilpin & Sandholm, 2007) re-
duces the computation complexity by solving an abstracted
game, which is much smaller than the original game. There
are two main kinds of abstractions, lossless abstraction and
lossy abstraction. Lossless abstraction algorithms (Gilpin
& Sandholm, 2007) ensures that each equilibrium in the
abstracted game is also an equilibrium in the original game.
For Poker games, it is able to reduce the size of the game
by one-to-two orders of magnitude. Lossy abstraction algo-
rithms (Kroer & Sandholm, 2014; Sandholm, 2015) create
smaller, coarser game, in the cost of a decrease in the solu-
tion quality. Both of above two kinds of abstractions can
be used to reduce the number of actions or the number of
information sets.
7. Experiment
In this section, we empirically compare our algorithm with
existing methods. We compare Lazy-CFR and Lazy-CFR+
with CFR, MC-CFR, and CFR+.
In our experiments, we use RM as the OLO solver as it is
commonly used in practice and we do not use any heuristic
pruning in CFR, CFR+, Lazy-CFR and Lazy-CFR+.
Experiments are conducted on variants of the Leduc hold’em
(Brown & Sandholm, 2015), which is a common benchmark
in imperfect-information game solving. Leduc hold’em is a
simplifed version of the Texas hold’em. In Leduc hold’em,
there is a deck consists of 6 cards, two Jack, two Queen and
two King. There are two dealt rounds in the game. In the
first round, each player receives a single private card. In the
second round, a single public card is revealed. A bet round
takes place after each dealt round, and player 1 goes first. In
our experiments, the bet-maximum varies in 5, 10 and 15.
As discussed in Lem 5, Alg. 1 uses O(1) running time
for each touched node, which is the same as in the vanilla
CFR, CFR+ and MC-CFR. Thus, we compare the number
of touched nodes of these algorithms, since nodes touched
is independent with hardware and implementation.
We measure the exploitability of these algorithms. The
exploitability of a strategy (σ1, σ2) can be interpreted
as the approximation error to the Nash equilibrium.
The exploitability is defined as maxσ′,1 u1((σ′,1, σ2)) +
maxσ′,2 u
2((σ1, σ′,2)).
Results are presented in Fig. 2. The performance of Lazy-
CFR is slightly worse than MC-CFR and CFR+ on Leduc-
5. But as the size of the game grows, the performance
of Lazy-CFR outperforms all baselines. And Lazy-CFR+
consistently outperforms other algorithms. Thus, empirical
results show that our method, lazy update, is a powerful
technique to accelerate regret minimization algorithms for
TEGIs. More specifically, on our largest experiment, Leduc-
15, with over 1.3× 105 infosets, Lazy-CFR converges over
200 times faster than CFR, and Lazy-CFR+ converges over
500 times faster than CFR+.
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Algorithm 2 A detailed implementation of Lazy-CFR
1: A two-player zero-sum extensive game.
2: Randomly initialize σ.
3: ∀h ∈ H , compute the counterfactual value cfvi(h) = ui(h|σ), f lag(h) = −1.
4: ∀I ∈ I, σ¯(I) = 0, s(I) = 0,∀a ∈ A(I), CFV (I, a) = 0.
5: while t < T do
6: for all i ∈ {1, 2} do
7: UPDATE1(Iir, i, [1.0, · · · , 1.0]).
8: end for
9: UPDATE2(hr, t, 0.0) where hr denotes the root of the history tree.
10: end while
11: RETURN σ¯.
A. The details of implementation
In this section, we discuss how to efficiently implement the idea of lazy update in TEGIs.
The challenge is that if we are going to update the strategy on an infoset, we need to compute the summation of counterfatual
rewards over a segment. If we compute the summation directly, then lazy update enjoys no improvement compared with the
vanilla CFR. Fortunately, this problem can be addressed in TEGIs. The key observation is that the reward on an infoset
changes if and only if the strategies on some infosets in the subtree changed.
More specifically, suppose we are going to compute the cumulative counterfactual reward on a history s over the segment
[T1, T2] and [T1, T2] is divided into [T1 =: t1, t2 − 1], [t2, t3 − 1], ..., [tn−1, tn − 1 = T2] where ui(s, t′) keeps the same in
[ti, ti+1 − 1]. Then we have:
T2∑
t=T1
piσt−i(s)u
i(s;σt) =
n−1∑
j=1
ui(s;σtj )
tj+1−1∑
t′=tj
pi−i(σt)
Obviously, by exploiting the tree structure and with elementary data structures, both ui(s;σtj ) and
∑tj+1−1
t′=tj pi−i(σt) can be
computed in running time O(1). Thus, we only need to analyze the number of segments.
We exploit the following property to bound the number of segments:
Property 1. In Lazy-CFR, if the strategy on an infoset I is updated in a round and I ∈ succ(I ′), then I ′ is also updated in
this round.
So that, suppose there are Nt infosets’ strategies updated in round t, there are at most O(Nt) new segments.
For convenience, let J(h, a) denote the history of taking action a after h and J(I, a) denote the infoset of taking action a
after h. Suppose there are n kinds of privation infomation for each player. For I ∈ Ii, letH(I, j) denote the underlying
history if the opponent’s private information is the j-th one. We elaborate Lazy-CFR in a more detailed pseudo-code, Alg. 2.
B. Proof of the regret bound in Eq. (2)
Regret matching can be viewed as an instance of online mirror descent (OMD) algorithm (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2012). We
first introduce the Fenchel’s duality for some kinds of regularizer R:
R∗(x) = sup
w
(〈x,w〉 −R(w))
We can get the derivative:
∇R∗(x) = arg max
w
(〈x,w〉 −R(w))
Lazy-CFR: fast and near-optimal regret minimization for extensive games with imperfect information
Algorithm 3 UPDATE1(I, i, p = [p(1), · · · , p(n)], t)
1: ∀j ∈ [n],m1(I, j) = m1(I, j) + p(j),m2(I, j) = m2(I, j) + p(j).
2: if
∑
j∈[n]m1(I, j) ≥ 1 then
3: if P (I) = i then
4: for all a ∈ A(I) do
5: Create p′ with p′(j) = m2(I, j) + p(j)
6: UPDATE1(J(I, a), i, p, t).
7: end for
8: ∀j ∈ [n], updflag(H(I, j), t).
9: for all a ∈ A(I), j ∈ [n] do
10: h = H(I, j).
11: CFV (I, a) = CFV (I, a) +m2(I, j)× cfvi(J(H(I, j), a))
12: m1(I, j) = m2(I, j) = 0.
13: end for
14: σ¯(I) = (s(I)σ¯(I) + σi(I)
∑
j∈[n]m1(I, j))/(s(I) +
∑
j∈[n]m1(I, j)), s(I) = s(I) +
∑
j∈[n]m1(I, j)
15: σi(I) =RM(CFV (I)).
16: else
17: for all a ∈ A(I) do
18: p′ = [0.0, · · · , 0.0]
19: for all j ∈ [n] do
20: p′(j) = (p(j) +m2(I, j))× σ(H(I, j), a)
21: end for
22: UPDATE1(J(I, a), i, p′, t)
23: end for
24: ∀j,m1(I, j) = m2(I, j) = 0
25: end if
26: end if
27: RETURN σ¯.
Algorithm 4 updflag(h, t)
1: if h is not the root of history tree and flag(h) 6= t then
2: flag(h) = t.
3: updflag(pa(h)) where pa(h) is the parent of h.
4: end if
5: RETURN σ¯.
OMD (see Algorithm 6) is a natural implementation of the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader framework (FoReL) (Shalev-
Shwartz et al., 2012). In FoReL, wt is selected by
∀t, wt = arg max
w
t−1∑
i=1
fi(w) +R(w)
7
It is known that if R is 1η -strongly-convex, then OMD enjoys the regret bound:
RegretT (u) ≤ R(u)−min
w
R(w) + η
T∑
t=1
‖zt‖2∗
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm.
7In (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2012) the environment provides the loss functions ft, thus they need to minimize the loss and apply mirror
descent each round. In our setting, we need to maximize the reward, so we instead apply mirror ascent here. We still use the name online
mirror descent to avoid the potential ambiguity.
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Algorithm 5 UPDATE2(h, t, p)
1: if flag(h) = t then
2: i = P (h), I = K(h, i).
3: Consider j satisfiesH(I, j) = h.
4: for all a ∈ A(h) do
5: CFV (I, a) = CFV (I, a) + cfvi(J(h, a))× (m2(I, j) + p).
6: UPDATE2(J(h, a), t, (p+m2(I, j))σi(I, a)).
7: end for
8: update cfvi(h).
9: m2(I, j) = 0.
10: end if
Algorithm 6 Online Mirror Descent
1: Initialize: x1 = 0
2: for t = 1, 2, · · · do
3: predict wt = ∇R∗(xt)
4: update xt+1 = xt + zt, where zt ∈ ∂ft(wt)
5: end for
Proof. In regret matching, w ∈ ∆(A). We choose R(w) = ‖w‖222η , and it’s easy to find that when wi = [x]i,+∑i[x]i,+ ,
〈x,w〉 −R(w) get its supremum∑i [x]2i,+2η , where [x]i,+ = max(xi, 0).
To show that regret matching is one kind of OMD, We first prove that ct − 〈wt, ct〉1 ∈ ∂wt〈wt, ct〉, which is equivalent to
prove that ∀u ∈ ∆(A),
T∑
t=1
〈u− wt, ct〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈u− wt, ct − 〈wt, ct〉1〉
Notice that 〈u− wt,1〉 = 0 as u,wt ∈ ∆(A), so the above inequality holds ∀t.
Thus, regret matching enjoys the regret bound:
RegretT (∆(A)) ≤ max
w∈∆(A)
R(w)− min
w∈∆(A)
R(w) + η
T∑
t=1
‖ct‖22
≤ 1
2η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖ct‖22
Let η = 1/
√∑T
t=1 ‖ct‖22, we prove (2)
C. Proof of Thm 1
We first prove Eq. (4).
Proof. Let J i(I, a) denote the infoset of player i after P (I) takes a at I . Without loss of generality, we assume that
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P (Iir) = i where I
i
r is the root of the tree of player i’s infoset. Then we have:
RiT (σ) =
T∑
t=1
ui((σi, σ−it ))−
T∑
t=1
ui((σit, σ
−i
t ))
=
T∑
t=1
(
ui((σi, σ−it ))− ui((σit|Iir→σi(I), σ−it ))
)
+
T∑
t=1
(
ui((σit|Iir→σi(I), σ−it ))− ui((σit, σ−it ))
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
ui((σi|Iir→σit(I), σ−it ))− ui((σit, σ−it ))
)
+
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈A(Iir)
σi(Iir, a)
(
ui((σi, σ−it ), J
i(Iir, a))− ui((σit|Iir→σi(I), σ−it ), J i(Iir, a))
)
· · · (recursively use this decomposition to the second term.)
=
∑
t
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)pi
−i
σt (I)(u
i(σt|I→σ(I), I)− ui(σt, I))
Now we prove Theorem 1.
Proof. With Eq. (4) and the regret bound of RM, we have
1
T
RiT (σ) =
1
T
∑
t
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)pi
−i
σt (I)(u
i(σt|I→σ(I), I)− ui(σt, I))
≤
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)O

√√√√n(I)∑
j=1
‖rj(I)‖2/T 2

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And then apply Jensen’s inequality and with some calculations, we have
1
T
RiT (σ) ≤
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)O

√√√√n(I)∑
j=1
‖rj(I)‖2/T 2

=
∑
I,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I
′)∑
I′,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I ′)
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)O

√√√√n(I)∑
j=1
‖rj(I)‖2/T 2

=
∑
I′,t
piiσ(I
′)pi−iσt (I
′)
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)∑
I′,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I ′)
O

√√√√n(I)∑
j=1
‖rj(I)‖2/T 2

=
∑
I′,t
piiσ(I
′)pi−iσt (I
′)
∑
I∈I′i
piiσ(I)
∑
t pi
−i
σt (I)∑
I′,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I ′)
O

√√√√ ∑n(I)j=1 ‖rj(I)‖2(∑
t pi
−i
σt (I)
)2
T 2

≤
∑
I′,t
piiσ(I
′)pi−iσt (I
′)O

√√√√∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)
∑
t pi
−i
σt (I)∑
I′,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I ′)
∑n(I)
j=1 ‖rj(I)‖2(∑
t pi
−i
σt (I)
)2
T 2

= O

√√√√√
∑
I′,t
piiσ(I
′)pi−iσt (I ′)
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)
∑n(I)
j=1 ‖rj(I)‖2∑
t pi
−i
σt (I)T
2

≤ O

√√√√D
T
∑
I∈Ii
piiσ(I)
∑n(I)
j=1 ‖rj(I)‖2∑T
t=1 pi
−i
σt (I)

The last inequality utilizes the fact that
∑
I′,t pi
i
σ(I
′)pi−iσt (I
′) ≤ DT . Now we finished the proof.
D. The lower bound analysis
Notice that the application of CFR does not depend on the game and adversary. So we here assume the adversary choose
both its strategy profile and the utility each turn.
Let J i(I, a) denotes the infoset of player i after P (I) takes a at I , nt(I) denotes the time player i arrives at I in the first t
round. We first show the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Let σ′i := arg maxσ
∑
I∈I pi
i
σ(I) and ξ
i
σ′i,Z
:=
∑
I∈IZ pi
i
σ′i
(I), we have that
ξi = Θ(ξiσ′i,Z) (11)
Here we make an implicit assumption that |A(I)| ≥ 2,∀I ∈ IP (I). Otherwise we can merge these infosets as we have
no choice but choose the only action, which contributes nothing to the regret. With this assumption, we can simply prove
Corollary 2 with the same techniques using in the proof of Corollary 1.
Now we prove Theorem 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume P (I) 6= i,∀I ∈ Z where Z is the set of terminal nodes (i.e. player i takes the
final action, otherwise, we can merge the adversary’s final action selection into the utility design). Let D denotes the case
satisfies Assumption 1 with ut(I) ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), ∀I ∈ IZ and pi−iσt (I) ∼ Multinomial( 1A ), ∀I ∈ Ii. a−iσt (I) denotes
the action sample from pi−iσt (I) at round t.
Notice that in D, for any σi,
∑
I∈I pi
i
σi(I) is the same, and we can omit the max operation in the following proof. For
general cases, we can set ut(I) = 0 if piσ′i(I) = 0, I ∈ Z, then we back to this case. For notation simplicity, we assume the
infoset tree is a full A-ary tree.
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Let ξiZ =
∑
I∈Z pi
i
σ(I). We prove that supT,A EDRiT ≥
√
ξiZT logA
2 . As Auer et al. (1995); Freund & Schapire (1997);
Dani et al. (2008) have shown, the lower bound for K-arm online linear optimization problem is
√
T logK
2 , which is
consistent to our
√
ξiZT logA
2 with ξ
i
Z = 1.
With a little abuse of notation, we use the term RiT (I) and ξ
i
Z(I) to represent the regret and the cumulative reaching
probability of the leaf nodes rooted at I .
We first show that if P (Ir) 6= i and supT,A EDRiT (J i(I, a)) ≥
√
ξiZ(J
i(I,a))T logA
2 ,∀a ∈ A(Ir), then supT,A EDRiT ≥√
ξiZT logA
2 . Notice that each subtree rooted at J
i(Ir, a), a ∈ A(Ir) have the same ξi, thus ξiZ(Ir) = AξiZ(J i(Ir, a)),∀a ∈
A(I), and we have that
sup
T,A
EDRiT (Ir) = sup
T,A
ED
∑
a∈A(Ir)
1a−iσt (Ir)=a
RiT (J
i(Ir, a))
= sup
T,A
∑
a∈A(Ir)
EDRinT (I)(J
i(Ir, a))
=
∑
a∈A(Ir)
sup
nT (Ji(I,a)),A
EDRinT (Ji(I,a))(J
i(Ir, a))
=A
√
ξiZ(J
i(Ir, a))T logA
2A
=
√
ξiZ(Ir)T logA
2
The third equality holds as each subtree rooted at J i(Ir, a), a ∈ A(Ir) are independent.
Then we consider the case P (Ir) = i with supT,A EDRiT (J i(I, a)) ≥
√
ξiZ(J
i(I,a))T logA
2 ,∀a ∈ A(Ir). We employ an
additional notation RiT,imm(Ir) = maxa∈A(Ir)
∑T
t=1 ut(σt|Ir→a, Ir)− ut(σt, Ir) to denote the immediate regret on the
root node. It’s obvious that EDRiT,imm(Ir) ≥ 0.
With Eq. (4), we can get:
sup
T,A
EDRiT (Ir) = sup
T,A
ED[RiT,imm(Ir) + 〈σi(Ir), [RinT (Ji(Ir,a))(J i(Ir, a))]a∈A(Ir)〉]
≥0 + 〈σi(Ir), [ sup
nT (Ji(I,a)),A
EDRinT (Ji(Ir,a))(J
i(Ir, a))]a∈A(Ir)〉
≥
∑
a∈A(Ir)
√
σi(Ir, a)ξi(J i(Ir, a))T logA
2
≥
√∑
a∈AIr σ
i(Ir, a)ξi(J i(Ir, a)) log T
2
=
√
ξiZ(Ir)T logA
2
Notice that the first inequality holds as given σi(Ir), each subtree rooted at J i(Ir, a), a ∈ A(Ir) are also independent.
Thus, with mathematical induction, we prove that supT,A EDRiT ≥
√
ξiZT logA
2 . With Corollary 2, we can get the mini-max
lower bound in Theorem 2.
